Analysis: Winning over Sunni tribes will be tougher this time
A critical part of President Obama's expansion of the U.S. military's Iraq mission is a plan to win over Sunni tribes, who were instrumental in driving out al-Qaeda militants in 2006 and 2007.
Yet prospects of a repeat success — this time against the Islamic State — are lower because conditions in Iraq are so different.
The 2006 tribal revolt in Anbar province, known as "the Awakening," hinged on a substantial number of U.S. troops sent into neighborhoods in the main city of Ramadi to protect the population.
"We were on the front lines with them," said Michael Barbero, a retired Army lieutenant general who served three tours in Iraq. U.S. forces could rush in to help if the tribes got in trouble, he said.
Under Obama's plan announced last week to send up to 450 additional military personnel to Iraq, U.S. forces won't co-mingle with the tribes. Instead, they will provide "outreach" from a well-defended base and avoid any direct recruitment or training, leaving that to the central government with U.S. support.
Administration officials say the additional advisers will be in Anbar, where they will help Iraq's government convince more Sunnis to join the fight against the Islamic State, also known as ISIL or ISIS.
"We expect that this move will open a new dimension in our and Iraq`s efforts to recruit Sunnis into the fight and to help the Iraqis coordinate and plan the critical effort to roll back ISIL in Anbar province," Defense Secretary Ashton Carter testified Wednesday before Congress.
The need for help from the tribes became acute when Ramadi fell to the Islamic State last month. The Iraqi military has shown scant progress in retaking the city.
The tribal leaders in Anbar have long been the key to winning support among the majority Sunni population in the province. Since the militants first moved into the province more than a year ago, some tribes have fought them, others have supported them and still others have remained on the fence.
The Sunni tribes have little sympathy for the Islamic State's radical ideology, but many mistrust Iraq's Shiite-dominated government and military even more, and accuse Baghdad of not doing enough to support the tribes.
The Iraqi government is using Shiite militias to help in its counteroffensive to retake Ramadi, a move that alienates the Sunni tribes, said Sterling Jensen, who has served as a civilian adviser to the U.S. military in Anbar. "Many see the Iraqi government as a larger enemy" than the Islamic State, Jensen said.
The U.S. military faced a similar situation nearly a decade ago, when an insurgency led by al-Qaeda militants erupted in the region following the toppling of dictator Saddam Hussein.
The Awakening was successful when Sunni tribes came to trust the U.S. forces because they protected tribal fighters from al-Qaeda retaliation. As a show of support, U.S. forces parked tanks outside the gates of the compound of Sheik Sattar abu Reisha, an important leader in Ramadi who said in 2006 that he would support American forces.
Sattar was later killed, but the movement he helped found continued to secure the province and helped bring Sunnis into the government throughout the country. Much of that goodwill evaporated after U.S troops withdrew in 2011 and the central government alienated the Sunnis.
Now with new restrictions on U.S. military activity, "why should they (Sunni tribes) stick their neck out?" Barbero said. "I don't see the conditions being set for any kind of Awakening other than wishful thinking."