Special inspector general report highlights 20 years of failure in Afghanistan

With the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban, the longest war in American history has now ended in abject failure. Having mismanaged the final withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Biden administration cannot evade responsibility for that failure. But by no means does President Joe Biden “own” it, as partisan critics are already insisting.  

There is plenty of blame to go around. For the United States, the collapse of U.S. policy in Afghanistan represents a “whole of government” debacle. Several presidential administrations and members of both political parties contributed to it. So, too, did the intelligence officials who advised policymakers and the generals who presided over the war’s conduct.  

At this moment of finger-pointing and score settling, it is important to recognize the underlying sources of this failure. This means looking beyond the tragic events of recent days or weeks. Understanding this very long war requires a deeper dive. Crucially, it requires a nonpartisan perspective.

What we need to learn on Afghanistan 

On that score, look no further than the latest report of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, released Tuesday. Created by Congress in 2008, SIGAR has regularly chronicled the progress (or lack thereof) of the Afghanistan War.

Yet this most recent report, pointedly titled "What We Need to Learn," differs from its predecessors in this sense: Over the course of its 140 pages, it offers a comprehensive summing up, identifying the lessons that most demand the attention of the American people.  

In that regard, the report could hardly be more timely – or more damning. Here, in brief, are some of SIGAR’s principal conclusions:

►The United States never developed a comprehensive strategy to achieve its objectives. “No single agency had the necessary mindset, expertise, and resources to develop and manage the strategy to rebuild Afghanistan.” Yet interagency collaboration was sketchy. 

►Programs designed to modernize and unify Afghanistan lacked cohesion and continuity, so much so that U.S. efforts “could be described as 20 one-year reconstruction efforts, rather than one 20-year effort.” Responsible officials drastically “underestimated the time and resources needed to rebuild Afghanistan.” 

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►Waste occurred on a mind-boggling scale. “Billions of reconstruction dollars were wasted as projects went unused or fell into disrepair. Demands to make fast progress incentivized U.S. officials to identify and implement short-term projects with little consideration for host government capacity and long-term sustainability.”

►The challenge of recruiting qualified Americans to serve in this difficult environment proved insurmountable. “U.S. personnel in Afghanistan were often unqualified and poorly trained.” For example, individuals assigned to advise Afghan police agencies “watched American TV shows to learn about policing.” Qualified people were hard to keep. “Every agency experienced annual lobotomies as staff constantly rotated out, leaving successors to start from scratch and make similar mistakes all over again.”

Flying blind in Afghanistan

►The absence of basic security undercut efforts to win Afghan hearts and minds. Wherever the Taliban operated, “U.S. officials were unable to make sufficient gains to convince frightened rural Afghans of the benefits of supporting their government.” Perhaps most tellingly: “The U.S. government did not understand the Afghan context and therefore failed to tailor its efforts accordingly.” In simplest terms, we were flying blind.  

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SIGAR’s "What We Need To Learn" by no means represents the last word on the Afghanistan debacle. But as a place to begin, it is essential reading, far more instructive than the latest breathless news bulletins coming out of Kabul.  

Andrew Bacevich is president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.  His new book is "After the Apocalypse: America’s Role in a World Transformed."